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STREAM CHANNELIZATION:
THE ECONOMICS OF THE CONTROVERSY*
JOHN P. BROWNt

INTRODUCTION
This paper is intended to be an economist's overview of the
controversy surrounding stream channelization. A number of federal
agencies, but particularly the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) of the
Department of Agriculture, have programs where the courses of
rivers are changed by clearing and snagging, straightening, deepening,
building separate channels, and building levees. The reasons provided
by the agencies for this work are mainly flood control or drainage,
although there are occasionally other reasons given as well. The controversy has arisen largely because of the environmentalists' deep
concern over the harm these programs are doing to the environment.
Several agencies of the Federal Government are engaged in stream
channelization. The Soil Conservation Service of the Department of
Agriculture and the Army Corps of Engineers are both heavily involved in channelization. The T.V.A. and the Bureau of Reclamation
are only slightly involved in channelization. The statistical data on
channelization are voluminous but difficult to interpret, probably
because so many different things can be called channel modification.
The SCS has approved 16,483 miles of waterways to be channelized
from July 1, 1960 to May 1, 1971. By 1971 4,209 miles had been
channelized. In that period it was estimated that $166.5 million were
spent on channelization by the SCS.' These figures are cited only to
suggest the order of magnitude of channelization. The major authority for the program comes from P.L. 566, the Watershed Protection
and Flood Prevention Act of 1954.2 The Act authorizes the Federal
Government to pay all the costs due to the flood prevention, all the
planning costs of the projects, and part of the other costs.
My approach will be to discuss very simple conceptual models of
rivers, focusing on the economic forces at hand, and analyzing the
relative efficiency of different decision-making mechanisms: private,
*1 am indebted to John Krutilla and Anthony Fisher for helpful comments and suggestions. Research for this paper was supported by Resources for the Future, Inc.
tAssociate Professor of Economics, Cornell Law School.
1. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1 Channel Modifications: An Environmental, Economic and
Financial Assessment 59 (1972) (Final Draft Report submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality).
2. 16 U.S.C. § § 1001-09 (Supp. 1974); 33 U.S.C. § 701b (1970).
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local government and federal government, from the point of view of
traditional welfare economics.'
There is an infinite variety of rivers and streams in the United
States, ranging from pristine natural rivers to urban storm sewers. It
ought to be clear from the outset that what is appropriate policy for
one will not be appropriate policy for the others. Hence it would be
inappropriate to say: "always improve channels" or "never channelize." Either of these would be gross rules that of necessity would be
wide of the mark. The channel improvement which would be a necessity on the Chicago River would be an atrocity on the wild reaches of
the Snake River. Similarly, to let nature take its course, as would be
correct on the Snake, would be a disaster on the Chicago.
Thus, one must find more subtle criteria for when channelization
should take place as well as what kind of channelization should be
done. These criteria should be more than rules for federal agencies to
follow; they should also be guidelines for what kinds of projects
should be under the jurisdiction of the federal agencies. It is precisely
over rules and justification that the debate is raging.
To aid our thinking let us organize our river reaches into a single
continuum of "wildness," ranging from the complete wild on the
extreme right to the completely tamed, paved, and covered storm
sewer on the left. In principle one can think of channelization as a
movement of a river's place in the spectrum to the left. It is either
impossible or very expensive to move the river to the right, that is, to
make it more wild, because the natural forces which tend to obliterate the impact of man work very slowly.
There are benefits available from having a river at any particular
point in the continuum. The esthetic and ecological benefits of a
3. Before I begin my analysis let me make one semantic caveat. As in other deep disputes, here, too, one can tell one's friends and one's enemies by the words they use. What
the SCS calls channel improvement the Audubon Society calls stream channelization.
Rather than try to find some neutral circumlocution such as channel modification, I have
decided to use them all as synonyms, choosing whichever sounded best in the context.
Our difficulties start very early. There are two quite different conceptions of what a river
is. On the one hand there is the view that a valley has two parts: a channel and the land on
either side. Then one can go on to say, as a Department of Agriculture memo did: "The
need for channel improvement is dependent upon the capability of the channel in its present
condition to satisfy the requirements, the use or uses man wants it to serve." U.S. Department of Agriculture, Stream Channelization 2 (undated memorandum).
On the other hand there is the view of the whole valley as part of the river system. There
is the normal channel, there are the flood plains which are used by the river from time to
time, and there is ground- and surface-water storage and flow. The complicated interactions
of these parts of the river support a complete ecological chain of species of flora and fauna
both in the water and near it. Then even to talk of channel improvement is to overlook a
complicated set of interactions where the interruption of one may cause complications and
deterioration in many others.
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wild river are difficult to over-estimate. On the other hand, paved,
covered channels provide valuable possibilities for disposal of waste
and excess water, and they economically use land which is extremely valuable in the heart of dense urban areas. It would be no more
appropriate to have meandering streams in downtown Chicago than it
would be to have concrete covered channels in wide, open farm
country.
Once the decision to alter the stream, that is, to move it to the left
of the continuum, is made, one has to decide how far to go. To move
is costly in two ways. First and most obvious are the construction
costs due to making the move and second are the opportunity costs
of giving up certain of the benefits of a wild river. The appropriate
goal is to compare these costs with the benefits to be received from
the move and to choose that move which maximizes the difference
between benefits and costs.
Assume that the entire valley is subject to flooding. For our purposes the only difference between higher land and lower land is that
the flooding of higher points will be less frequent than the flooding
of lower points. The only effect of channel modification will be to
change the probability of a flood for all the affected areas. Thus we
shall be led to analyze the effect on the value of land of changing the
probability of floods. 4
My major focus is on the economics of the two major claimed
benefits of channel modification: flood probability reduction and
drainage of wet-lands. After discussing them, I will discuss some of the
externalities involved in channelization: those downstream, those for
other users of the stream (such as fisherman), and those for later
generations. I then turn to look at substitutes for channelization, both
physical and organizational, including dams, flood plain zoning, flood
insurance, and relief payments. Finally, I will discuss the appropriateness of various decision structures and how the pecularities of present
decision rules for channelization are manifested.
TYPES OF CHANNELIZATION
Consider a typical stream cross-section and a typical flood which
occurs with some given probability P. There are several possible
structural modifications which can reduce the area flooded. First,
one can increase the channel cross-section by excavating, usually
with a trapezoidal cross-section. Then the flood will be contained in
4. My own approach is to limit my discussions to what I understand, taking some care to
make explicit the model of a river in which I carry out my analysis. In general I will not
explicitly consider the complex interactions often discussed by hydrologists and ecologists,
but I hope it will be clear how such discussions might be entered into with the use of my
analysis.
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the increased cross-section, while the normal flow will barely cover
the bottom of the trapezoid. Second, one can build levees which
have the same effect as excavation, except that everything is raised
up several feet. In the case of levees, the stream itself is not touched
unless the levees are built from material taken from the streambed,
and the ecological damage is far less severe than excavation. However, there is a danger that the levees can either break or be overtopped.
Third, one can increase the velocity of the stream by lowering the
frictional drag caused by impediments in the river bottom and the
adjacent flood plain. This is done by removing trees, shrubs, and
boulders and replacing them with mowed grass or concrete. If this is
done, the velocity of the floodwater will be increased and a smaller
cross-section will be needed to accommodate a given flow. A difficulty with increasing the velocity is that the velocity may be greater
than the soil of the channel can tolerate. In this case further modification to the streambed, such as riprapping it with stone or paving
it, may be necessary. Finally, one can impound the flood waters
upstream either behind a dam or where it falls by using better land
management techniques, such as contour-plowing. The use of any of
these techniques does not preclude the use of others in combination,
and they are often used that way.
The first method of stream modification, excavation, serves another purpose which is important to the controversy over channelization. Excavation of streams allows adjacent land to be drained. Flood
control is intended to remove extremes of high water; drainage is
intended to remove normally high water. When there is a wet area
with a high water table, it can often be drained by cutting a network
of channels through it and out to a river or stream, if the river or
stream is low enough. Lower the streambed and more adjacent land
can be drained into it. If the land is drained sufficiently, it can be
converted from a swamp to agriculture or real estate development.
The draining of wetlands has a much larger ecological impact than
does the excavation for flood routing.
THE EFFECTS OF FLOODS

An important building block of this analysis is how the value of
land changes as the probability that it will be flooded changes. This I
have analyzed much more extensively elsewhere; what I present here
is a capsule version.'
Presume that the landowner chooses that activity which has the
5. See J. Brown, The Economic Effects of Floods: Investigations of Stochastic Model of
Rational Investment Behavior in the Face of Floods (1972).
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highest expected present value among the finite set of available
mutually exclusive activities for the land. The value of the land is
precisely the expected present value of the returns of putting the
land to its best use. If we can calculate how the expected present
value of the best use of the land changes as the probability of
flooding changes, we have calculated the change in the value of the
land, which is what we wanted to do. It is important to note that the
best use of the land need not be the same after the probability of
floods changes. For example, if the land is very prone to floods, the
best use may be a simple low capital crop such as alfalfa or barley,
but if the land gets better flood protection, the best use may be quite
different, housing, for example.
It is useful to graph the relationship between the value of several
activities on the one hand and P on the other.[Figure 1]
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To make the example more concrete we have labeled the available
activities woodlands, corn, and housing. The value of woodlands if
affected relatively little by flooding; the value of corn, more so; and
the value of housing, quite a bit. When the probability of floods is
greater than P1 , then the best use of the land is as woodland; when it
is between P0 and P1 , the best use is raising corn; and when the
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probability of a flood is less than P0 , the best use of the land is for
housing.
Let the natural probability of floods on a particular piece of land
be P*. Then optimal use of the land is as woodland and the value of
the land is V*. Now it is proposed that the landowner channelize the
local stream at a cost of C dollars, with the effect of lowering the
probability of floods from P* to P'. At P', the optimal use of the
land is in corn and the value of the land is V'. For simplicity let the
authority to channelize be in the hands of the single landowner.
Should the landowner undertake the channelization? The channelization measure should be undertaken if the cost is less than the change
in the expected present value of the land, C<V' - V*. The correct
measure of the benefit of the channelization is the change in the
expected present value, V' - V*. Aggregation of the benefits of flood
prevention over the whole valley is simple in principle even though
difficult in practice. We do not have space to go into it here.
The net benefits of draining land are much simpler to calculate, at
least in principle. It seems unnecessary to consider the optimal
amount of drainage to provide for a piece of land; presumably, it is
sufficient to consider simply whether or not it should be drained. We
merely compare the value of the highest use of drained land with the
value of the highest use of wetland. The difference is the benefit of
draining the wetland. 6
EXTERNALITIES

Changing the course of a river may have many effects other than
the strictly local ones (lowering the probability of floods on adjacent
land and draining that land) that we have just discussed. These effects we call externalities because they are typically not taken into
account by the local decisionmakers. There will also be externality or
public good problems within the local area when it is now owned by
one individual or firm. These externalities may be classified into
three groups: downstream effects, effects on other users of the river,
and the effects on later generations.7
First, the intent of most channelization measures is to increase the
velocity of the stream. What effect will this have downstream? Because the water passes through more quickly, losses of water due to
6. Here, I am not discussing the major issue regarding drainage, namely, the difference
between private and social cost. Wetlands have important ecological externalities associated
with them. They provide sanctuary for wildlife ranging from mosquitos to deer and moose.
The comments here are true whether one considers benefits from either the private or the
social point of view.
7. See Arthur D. Little, at supra note 1. I have used the A. D. Little study as my major
source for the physical effects of channelization.
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evaporation will be reduced. Similarly, groundwater holdings and
recharging will be reduced. Thus the amount of water received downstream will usually be increased. It is also possible that flood peaks
can be accumulated by the channelization measures so that the flood
peak downstream is larger than without the project. A project upstream may increase the demand for projects downstream. When
velocity is increased, the sediment in the water is transported farther
than otherwise, so that sedimentation will be increased downstream.
Another serious downstream effect is the collection of nonbiodegradables in lakes below. When streams flow slowly, nonbiodegradables tend to sediment out as they flow downstream. When the
stream is channelized, the effect is to increase the velocity and to
reduce the sedimentation of the chemicals, resulting in their accumulation downstream.
Second, adjacent landowners are not the only people affected by
the modification of a stream. Fishermen, hunters, birdwatchers, and
passers-by all have something at stake in the river's ecology. Their
stake is different from that of those who buy the products of the
adjacent farms, for example, because their interests are not reflected
in the market. A wealth-maximizing farmer has no incentive to take
into account the interests of nature buffs, whereas he does have
adequate incentive to take into account the interests of his customers.
These and other externalities associated with channelization can
be severe. Streams can be rendered essentially sterile by channelization. In regard to fish, for example, the effect depends on the type of
construction used. Concrete-lined trapezoid-shaped channels are
apparently totally destructive of fish life. Concrete-lined V-shaped
channels are only slightly better: they allow continuous flow at a
sufficient depth for fish passage, but high temperatures in these channels resulting from lack of shade can prevent fish passage. Excavation
of a channel also destroys sources of food and places of shelter for
fish. However, watercourses can recover to some extent, depending
on the nature and extent of the damage; thus, this damage may be
temporary rather than permanent.
The effect on wildlife can be major or minor. Typically, channelization entails removal of almost all vegetation from the immediate
channel area. When the project is a drainage project, additional clearing of the drained land may be undertaken to accommodate new uses
made possible by the drainage. The vegetation that is destroyed is the
cover and the habitat for the wildlife. When vegetation is destroyed,
the wildlife either leaves or dies. It is possible that the new crops that
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replace the destroyed vegetation may provide food and cover for
wildlife, but this wildlife often consists of different species. In that
case one must evaluate the two sets of species in order to decide
whether the net effects on wildlife are good or bad. Although the
theoretical possibility exists for an improvement for wildlife, it is
apparent that it usually does not work out that way. The major
opposition to channelization has come precisely from the wildlife
constituency: the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the National
Rifle Association, and the state fish and game departments.
Now I turn to the third category of external effects, those on
future generations. Channel modification always alters the ecology of
the region, sometimes only temporarily but sometimes permanently.
When it is permanent, future generations are affected. The opportunity cost of the change is the availability of the original ecology: the
opportunity cost of not modifying the ecology is, of course, the
benefits from the channelization.'
There is one way in which this catalog of external effects is striking. When landowners channelize for their own benefit, almost all the
effects external to the market are negative. If that is the case, then
landowners, if left to their own devices, would tend to provide too
much channel modification because they have left the negative effects on the environment out of their calculations. The appropriate
role of government in such a case would be to represent the interests
which have been hurt and reduce the amount of channelization from
what would have been produced privately. In fact we have just the
opposite. The government subsidizes channelization measures and
causes the total amount of channelization to be much larger than the
market would determine, rather than smaller as optimality would
require.
ALTERNATIVES TO CHANNELIZATION

The major economic impact of flood control measures and wetland drainage is to raise the value of the land protected or drained.
Obviously there is a variety of other governmental measures which
could achieve the same effect. The first is a federal flood relief program. Flood relief is best understood in this context as a payment
from the government to the landowner given after each flood that
meets certain criteria that make it a "disaster." In principle the ex8. The intertemporal aspects of this problem are handled in Arrow & Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty and Irreversibility, 88 Q. J. Econ. 312 (1974), and Fisher,
Krutilla & Cicchetti, The Economics of EnvironmentalPreservation, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 605
(1972). The essential notion of these papers is straightforward: the expected benefits of an
irreversible decision should be adjusted to reflect the loss of options it entails.
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pected present value of these checks should be added to the rest of
the income that can be earned on the land. Flood relief is a transfer
of income from taxpayers in general to people who live in floodplains. It encourages people to take greater flood risks than they
otherwise would, thereby increasing the total risk due to flooding.
Insofar as the relief is complete for flood losses, there is no incentive
for landowners to treat floodplains any differently from land that
has no flood risk. The advantage of a flood relief policy as a substitute for stream channelization measures is that it has no direct environmental impact. This discussion of flood relief policies is probably not too relevant for much of the stream channelization measures, because the channelization measures are only intended to
protect against relatively frequent, relatively small floods which
would not qualify the area as a disaster area. 9
The availability of flood insurance is another way of raising the
value of flood-threatened land of the owners who are averse to risk,
something that we usually assume to be the case. Buying flood insurance, like buying any other kind of insurance, is tantamount to
exchanging a risky asset for a riskless one. This exchange makes the
asset more valuable to the owner, and if his portfolio is sufficiently
varied, causes no loss to the insurer. The present government policy
of providing flood insurance at subsidized rates is even more beneficial to the landowner. Usually the floods protected against by channelization measures are the quite frequent ones, and as such there is
relatively little risk (the cost can be predicted) and hence relatively
little to be gained by redusing the risk by providing flood insurance.
Flood insurance becomes much more important when the floods are
less frequent because the costs cannot be predicted accurately.
There are two other possible alternatives to channelization which
do not add to the value of the land. They are flood plain zoning and
governmental buying of the river banks. I shall deal with these in
turn.
Flood plain zoning at its simplest is a proscription. It limits the
number of options open to the landowner. He must choose from a
restricted set of activities, the legal ones, rather than from the set of
all technologically feasible ones. The justification for the zoning is
either to protect the individual from his own ignorance or folly, or to
protect the rest of society from acts which infringe upon others. If
the activities which are zoned against are not the most valuable to
the, landowner, he is not affected by the zoning. If the activities are
9. For a more complete discussion of the effect of relief policies, see Brown, supra note
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the ones the landowner prefers, then he is being made worse off
(from his own point of view). Zoning is justifiable, however, if the
prohibited activity would increase damages to other landowners.
Occasionally it has been suggested that the government could buy
the land for less money than it would cost to channelize it. How
should the government decide between these two alternatives?
Problems arise if the agency cannot accurately estimate the value of
the land as a function of the probability of floods. If accurate land
values can be estimated, however, the correct rule for the agency is
to recommend channelization if the increment in the value of the
land is greater than the cost of the channelization. A fortiori, if it is
known that the price of the land after the channelization measure is
less than the cost of the channelization measure, the agency should
recommend not channelizing.
If the agency decides not to channelize, should it buy the land?
Only if the value of the best government activity is greater than the
value of the best private activity on that land. The problem becomes
considerably more complicated when we consider the possibility of
growth over time. I cannot do a complete analysis of that issue here.
Rather, I would like to discuss an intriguing example that was raised
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. They recently suggested that
they buy 8,500 acres of Charles River marshes in Massachusetts as a
substitute for channelization. 1 0 Here, presumably, if the land were
not reserved by the government, it would be developed as part of the
metropolitan area, with the effect of reducing the water-holding
characteristics of the land and speeding the water downstream with
the result of higher probabilities of flooding downstream. Thus,
instead of taking a positive act to reduce the probability of flooding,
the Corps is proposing to prevent acts which would increase the
probability of floods. Similar proposals have been made by an
Assistant Secretary of the Interior.1 1
A more subtle approach would be for the Government to buy
easements rather than buy the land outright. Thus the Government
might pay the owner for the right to all uses which are not appropriate on the land. The user would stay on the land but would not
have the right to use his land in inappropriate ways. The buying of
easements using eminent domain is essentially equivalent to zoning,
except that when easements are bought, the landowner is compensated for lost opportunities. There are many interesting legal
10. Hearings on Stream Channelization Before the Subcomm. on Conservation & Natural
Resources of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at
1499 (1971).
11. Id., pt. 2, at 399.

October 19741

STREAM CHANNELIZA TION

questions involved in deciding when the use of the police power of
zoning is appropriate and when use of the power of eminent domain
is appropriate.' 2
CHOICE OF JURISDICTION

One of the most interesting aspects of the stream channelization is
the question of centralization. Which group of people is responsible
for deciding to make channel modifications, which group will pay for
it, and does it make any difference which group decides and pays?
Along the way I shall develop what might be called a theory of the
appropriate level of centralization.
Here I shall distinguish three methods of deciding about channel
modification: individual, local, and national. First consider the
possibility of having all decisions made by individuals. This is
essentially the market solution. Under what conditions will it be
appropriate? As is well known in welfare economics, the effectiveness of a market solution depands on whether or not there are
externalities. It is typical for individuals to drain land themselves
becuase the effects of the drainage do not go beyond the boundaries
of their own land. If the drainage benefits two landowners, presumably they can get together for the project and come to some sort of
appropriate allocation of costs. Drainage in that case is a joint
product to the two pieces of property and economics has little to say
about the allocation of costs between the two.
When the number of benefactors increases, we can expect greater
difficulties because of the cost of transactions among the landowners
and the possibility of games of strategy and holdouts, unless landowners can be excluded from draining their land into the common
channel. An interesting prototype of a problem in joint products
arises.' ' Where landowners can be excluded from using the channel
to drain their property, a purely private club or corporation will be
formed to build the entire channel and there is no call for government interference of any kind. The solution is not unique with
12. U.S. Water Resources Council, Regulation of Flood Hazard Areas to Reduce Flood
Losses, pt. 3, ch. 4 (1971).
13. An identical problem appears in rural electrification. There are homes along a road all
without power, Should power be brought in, and if so, how should the line be paid for?
The following figure depicts three adjacent parcels of land parallel to a river. The land is
wetland and we presume that each of the landowners, A, B, and C, would benefit from
having a channel come to his property. Assume further that there is a freely available
right-of-way at the end of their property in which a drainage channel can be built. To make
the model simple let us assume that the cost of building the channel is 1 unit if it goes only
to A's property, 2 units if it goes to B's, and 3 units if it goes to C's. Let us further assume
that the builders of the channel can prevent anyone else from using it without their permission. Other assumptions can be made but they complicate the analysis.
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respect to how the costs of the channel modification will be shared.
It makes no difference for the theory how the costs are shared; that
is a dilemma which can be solved only using criteria outside economic analysis and then not to everyone's satisfaction.
Where the channel owner or operator is powerless to prevent
individual landowners from draining into the channel, the problem
becomes much more complicated and a market solution cannot be
expected to be optimal. In the drainage example above, each landowner would like the others to build the channel without him,
because he need not participate in the building in order to participate
in the benefits.
A very similar problem arises with flood protection. It is easiest to
see if the channel modification is a levee. Consider three parallel
strips of land which all end at a river's edge. We shall ignore any
effects on the other side of the river. The situation is depicted in
Figure 2. Each person can build a levee around his own land or
groups can cooperate to build a common levee at lower per unit cost.
This is true because a retaining wall must be constructed at each end
of the levee in order to prevent water from going around the levee on
the wrong side. No matter how long the levee is, only one pair of end
structures must be built. They are analogous to fixed costs, and we
have a constant marginal cost industry.
RIGHT OF WAY
FOR DRAINAGE

RIVER

A

B

C

Now we have set up a problem amenable to analysis using the concept of the core of the
economy. See L. Telser, Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory 48-57 (1972). Considering all possible coalitions, which allocations will be stable in the sense that no coalition
can make itself better off by blocking the allocation? These allocations are said to be in the
core. The following example involves a direct application of Telser's methods to local
channel modification decisionmaking.
An allocation is completely described for our purposes by the net value received by each
individual as a result of the allocation. If xA, xB, and xC are the net values received by A, B,
and C respectively from a particular allocation, the allocation is described by (XA, xB, XC).
The respective benefits are designated by bA , b B , and b C . A coalition is simply a group of
individuals and can contain as few as one individual or as many as the whole group. Denote
the membership of a coalition by a list S. Denote by V(S) the value to the coalition, which
is the best total value to the coalition when they only trade among themselves. Then, for

this example, we have:
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The opportunity for a free ride comes to the man in the middle if
the end structures are sufficiently more costly than the levee. If
someone in the middle were to drop out of the coalition, it still
might be less costly for the remainder of the coalition to protect him
rather than truncate the levee and add two more end structures.
When there is a free rider problem, there is sufficient cause for the
three neighbors to form a governmental body with the power to tax
in order to organize the channel modification and to ensure that all
beneficiaries help pay for the channel. The form of government
suggested is a local government with powers limited to building and
maintaining channels. The local government would have an incentive
to build the channel only if total benefits were greater than total
costs. The local Water Conservation Districts, which are formed to
build and maintain projects subsidized by the Soil Conservation
Service, are precisely such jurisdictions. The major difference is that
the local Water Conservation Districts are subsidized to a large extent
by the SCS; usually the local districts only need pay a small part of
the total cost.
If

bA=bB=bc=2

V(A)

= bA-i

= XA

-1

V(B)

= bB-

2

= xB

-0

V(C)

=

bc-3

= xc

=-1

V(A,B)

=bA+bB-2

= XA+X

V(A,C)

= bA+bc- 3

= XA+XC

-

V(B,C)

=bB+bC-3

= X+X

= 1

V(A,B,C)

=

bA+bB+bC-3

2

B

= XA+XB+XC

1

3

An allocation (XA, XB, XC) is said to be in the core if no member of the coalition can do

better by himself.
In particular, the sum of the x, has to be at least as large as 3 or the coalition of all three
can do better. However, it cannot be larger than 3 because there is no way that benefits
could exceed costs by more than 3. Furthermore, the only way that the full 3 can be

obtained is by building the entire channel. Now, how will the channel be financed? The
most that A can be forced to pay is 1. B can be forced to pay no more than 2, but C must
pay at least 1. Possible payment schedules include (1,1,1), (0,1,2), (1,0,2) and (0,2,1).
Finally, we should note that a channel will be built by private cooperation only if the sum

of the benefits of channelization is larger than the total cost of the channel.
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FIGURE 2
When neighbors cannot be excluded from the benefits of the
channel modification, the problem is more complex and there is no
assurance that free contracting among individuals seeking their own
best interests will arrive at an efficient solution. In the terms which
we have used above, the core may be empty. It may be expected that
a subcoalition can do better by dropping out of a coalition and
enjoying the benefits of the others' efforts because the subcoalition's
exclusion is impossible.
In this case, another possible mechanism may be brought to bear:
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the power to tax. A local governmental body such as a water conservation district can be formed to provide the service of channel
modification. The body then would be given the authority to tax
private parties in the jurisdiction. The effect of this is to reduce the
number of feasible allocations by not allowing allocations where one
party pays and one does not. In that case we might expect that
among the available allocations a majority would find it better to
support channel modification and pay taxes for it than not. It is an
interesting question, not completely explored, as to precisely what
the constraints are to forming such a jurisdiction, and what level of
efficiency it assures. It seems apparent that one could construct an
example where a jurisdiction could be formed to build a channel
modification structure where the total benefits were less than the
total costs. This could happen if the total benefits to the controlling
majority were greater than the total costs to the controlling majority.
The difference would be made up by exploiting the minority. Precisely how this might work would depend on the precise rules for
protecting minorities when jurisdictions are formed. If the jurisdiction contains members who have not joined it voluntarily, we have,
in effect, an (inefficient) income transfer from the minority in the
jurisdiction to the majority.
The danger of a jurisdiction which is too large is that there is likely
to be an inefficient transfer of income from one group in the jurisdiction to another. In the case at hand it is a transfer from the
taxpayers in general to the beneficiaries of the flood control or drainage measure. The transfer would likely be inefficient, because the
same amount of money transferred in cash to the same group would
make the group at least as well off as the transfer conditional on
building a channelization measure and would have the same resource
burden on the paying group.
What problems arise if the jurisdiction is too small, that is, the
jurisdiction does not include all the people affected by the decision
to build or not? The answer is: none, if those outside the jurisdiction
are free to negotiate with the jurisdiction. Analytically then, the
jurisdiction can be treated like one of the owners of property in the
analysis above. If, on the other hand, it is not possible for those
outside to negotiate with the jurisdiction, we then have the standard
case of externalities. We can expect the channelization to be too
extensive if the external effects are harmful, and not sufficient if the
externalities are beneficial.
If there are externalities of the channelization measures outside
the jurisdiction of the water conservation disctrict, then potentially
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there is a role for the federal government, namely, to reflect the
effect of these externalities to the local jurisdiction when it makes its
decisions.
There are several ways that have been suggested for the government to overcome the effects of externalities. For example, for
downstream externalities it has been suggested by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) that stream channelization projects
are subject to the recently rediscovered Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899.'" The Act prohibits the dumping of "any refuse into any
navigable water of the United States or into any tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into
such navigable water" without first getting a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers. First, the MRDC claims that few, if any, waters
of the United States fall outside the jurisdiction of the Act, and
second, it claims that there is ample precedent for including sediment
and fill which are typical byproducts of any channelization. This
approach, if valid, would force the Corps to take part in the planning
of any channelization measure, with explicit responsibility for downstream externalities.
Now let us turn to the effect of centralizing decisions in the
federal government. In the simple situation we have been discussing
(where there are no effects of the channel modification beyond the
borders of the local water conservation district), there is little reason
to have the federal government involved. If the government subsidizes the construction of the channel modification, then each of
the three beneficiaries in the simple model above receive full benefits, bA, bB, and bc .1 But the three may only be responsible for 10
per cent of the cost for example, depending on the cost-sharing
arrangement of the agency. This can be looked upon as an income
transfer to the local district of 90 per cent of the costs for constructing channelization measures. For this example, it is clear that
the rational local district will continue to propose projects until the
marginal benefit to them of an additional dollar spent on channelization is ten cents. This is an invitation to inefficiency and overly
extensive channelization measures.
If the local jurisdiction has the authority to finance and construct
the projects, what justification is there for the federal government to
14. 30 Stat. 1148 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). See the testimony of E.
L. Strohbehn, Jr., on behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council in Hearings, supra
note 8, pt. 1, at 148-5 6. The NRDC also alleges that the Corps would have to consult with
the Bureau of Sport Fisheries & Wildlife of the Department of the Interior to make sure that
the project is consistent with the provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16

U.S.C. § § 661-666C (1971).
15. See note 12, supra.
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subsidize these enterprises? It seems clear that on the basis of standard public finance arguments about optimal jurisdiction, there is no
basis for the subsidy. In fact, if it is true (as I have suggested) that
the great balance of externalities generated by the project is negative,
then the appropriate role of the federal government should be to tax
rather than subsidize the projects.
For a moment let us assume away the problem of externalities.
Let us consider a project which a local jurisdiction values highly
enough that it would go ahead and build on its own, paying for it by
a local tax. Then the effect of the federal subsidy is equivalent to a
cash payment to the local taxpayers in proportion to the amount
that they would be assessed if the federal government did not subsidize the project. In that case we need not even consider the direct
beneficiaries of the project because they would get the project in any
case. It is clear that the program is a simple redistribution of income
from taxpayers in general to individuals in the jurisdictions having an
appropriate project available in proportion to their local tax bill. If
P.L. 566, the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, were
rewritten explicitly as the program of redistribution just described, it
is inconceivable that any Congress would pass it.
Recall though that we came to this conclusion assuming that the
local jurisdiction would have built the project in any case. If the local
jurisdiction would not have built it, then we are in a worse situation
than before. The people of the local jurisdiction do not sufficiently
value the project to build it themselves, that is, benefits are less than
costs. Consider the cost of the project (less than the actual cost) at
which the local jurisdiction would just accept the project and finance
it out of local taxation. That is the amount of the subsidy received
by the local taxpayers; the cost to the federal government is much
greater. The difference is a deadweight loss. This loss comes about
because of the disincentive due to the subsidy.
Notice that this argument is not affected by a claim of great
cost-effectiveness for the project. If the benefit-cost ratio is really 5
to 1, then that merely assures that the local jurisdiction would undertake the project independently. It is an argument for the project, not
for the subsidy.
An important issue is raised here: that of the pork barrel. There is
a large and growing literature by economists and political scientists
on the theory of vote trading and favor trading. It is illegal for
Congress to order the government simply to pay cash to a congressman or his constituents in return for the congressman cooperating
with others to join a winning coalition on some issue in which the
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congressman or his constituents have no direct interest. Many students argue that since some sort of side payments are necessary for
government to function, we should look upon these stream channelization measures as convenient forms of legal side payments to
cooperative congressional districts.' 6
If that is the case, then we must analyze whether these channelization measures are the most appropriate or most efficient ways of
providing side payments. I would argue that they appear to be quite
inefficient subisdy measures. The main reason is that in order to
benefit from stream channelization measures, one must own property very close to a stream. It is not clear that by any conceivable set
of values the most important people, those most deserving of rewards, are those who live next to streams. A second reason to question the efficacy of channelization measures as pork barrel is that the
ecological side effects (externalities) of the measures may well be
damanging to the very people who are members of the coalition that
you want to reward. A third reason is that the subsidy in this form
may well be inefficient. If the cost-benefit rules of the agency were
complete, correct, and uniformly understood and adhered to, the
result would be an efficient subsidy to the benefactors, but insofar as
the rules are not correct or understood or followed, the subsidy will
be inefficient. I am not sanguine about the efficiency of the subsidy.
CONCLUSIONS

There is little that can be said a priori about the merits of individual stream channelization projects other than voicing the normal
skepticism which suggests that many are ill-conceived. That this is
true seems apparent from the enormous opposition that they have
generated. On the other hand it seems equally clear that some of the
projects have merit. Almost any use of land other than leaving it in
its natural state requires some alteration of the normal flow of surface water. The complex interactions which are suggested by the
word ecology require us to take more care in the alteration of flood
flows then we have taken in the past.
Having come down right in the middle of the fence in evaluating
the actual merits of stream channelization measures, I can now go on
to make some considerably stronger and more direct recommendations about the financing of stream channelization projects. There is
no convincing ground for Federal subsidy of stream channelization
16. R. Morgan, Governing Social Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization
viii, 368, 371 (1965).
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projects. Using Musgrave's now standard division of government
function, stabilization, allocation, and distribution, we can immediately rule out stabilization effects. There are undeniably allocation
effects due to stream channelization of the sort which are used to
justify government intervention. The vast proportion of these, however, are local. Flood prevention and drainage are strictly local in
their effects, benefiting only riparian landowners. The local soil
conservation districts which are the local sponsors of the channelization measures are the appropriate jurisdiction to undertake the
construction and its financing. If the local district is unwilling to
finance the project completely (assuming that federal assistance were
unavailable), then that is strong evidence that the project should not
be built. The only argument for Federal intervention is if the effects
of the project go beyond the jurisdiction that is building the project.
Often the deleterious externalities are of consequence beyond a jurisdiction's project but the major benefits of the project, flood control
or drainage, are not. Effects which go beyond the borders of the
appropriate jurisdiction are the adverse effects on fish and game, as
well as other adverse ecological and conservation effects. Here the
appropriate role of the Federal Government is to represent thse
otherwise unrepresented interests and restrict rather than encourage
the construction of these projects.
Stream channelization measures clearly have redistributive effects,
but they are a very clumsy tool for that purpose. The major beneficiaries are riparian landowners, a group which is a very poor proxy
for any conceivable group that one might legitimately (or ctherwise)
want to transfer income to. They are not all poor, rich, black, white,
Democrat, Republican, or Whig. They are a random selection of
citizens who do not have any particular claim to the Treasury simply
because they own property next to flowing water.
Thus, the recommended approach would be to end the federal
subsidy of stream channelization measures. The job can and should
be done by local agencies. But what should be done with the large
and powerful Soil Conservation Serive bureaucracy? Presumably it is
naive to suggest that it simply disappear. The SCS could continue in
its advisory and consultant role to help local agencies in the planning
of stream channelization measures. It has built up considerable
expertise and know-how, whereas the local agencies are typically
much less experienced. A more creative use of the agency would be
for it to be put to use to identify and conserve those lands which are
critical beyond local boundaries. It might follow the lead of the
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Corps of Engineers which has suggested that the marshes of the
Charles River in Massachusetts be bought and set aside. It should also
continue the unfinished work, started in the Dust Bowl Era, of
teaching and encouraging landowners to use the techniques of soil
conservation.

